Why Take Both Boxes?
Name
WhyTakeBothBoxes.pdf
Size
139.38 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
d37a40a7d8cd4dd78203ea4621f04fa0
Author(s)
Spencer, Jack
Wells, Ian Thomas
Date Issued
October 2017
Journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Citation
Spencer, Jack and Ian Wells. “Why Take Both Boxes?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (October 2017) © 2017 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPR.12466
