Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax
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Author(s)
Cai, Yang
Candogan, Ozan
Papadimitriou, Christos
Daskalakis, Konstantinos
Date Issued
January 2016
Journal
Mathematics of Operations Research
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Citation
Cai, Yang; Candogan, Ozan; Daskalakis, Constantinos, et al. “Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax.” Mathematics of Operations Research 41, 2 (May 2016): 648–655. © 2016 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-sum games, Nash equilibria can be found efficiently with linear programming. We also show that the set of coarse correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. In contrast, other important properties of two-person zero-sum games are not preserved: Nash equilibrium payoffs need not be unique, and Nash equilibrium strategies need not be exchangeable or max-min.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0745
