Monotonicity and Implementability
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Ashlagi_Monotonicity and.pdf
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483.39 KB
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Author(s)
Ashlagi, Itai
Braverman, Mark
Hassidim, Avinatan
Monderer, Dov
Date Issued
September 2010
Journal
Econometrica
Publisher
Econometric Society
Citation
Ashlagi, Itai et al. “Monotonicity and Implementability.” Econometrica 78.5 (2010) : 1749-1772.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.
MIT Department
Sloan School of Management
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Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8882
