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  4. Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions

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Author(s)
Hendricks, Kenneth
•
Pinkse, Joris
•
Porter, Robert H.
Date Issued
1999
Publisher
Cambridge, Mass. : Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Series/Report no.
Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) ; no. 99-19
Description
October, 1999
August, 1999--Added t.p
Persistent DSpace Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63529
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