The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation
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The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups 4247-02.pdf
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Author(s)
De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr.
De Figueiredo, John M.
Date Issued
June 10, 2002
Series/Report no.
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4247-02
Abstract
One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to
which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on
interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal -
is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies
between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a
formal theoretical model, how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in
the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking
stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of
important insights about each stage - which cannot be observed by examining each
one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the
court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, 1) as courts
become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments
become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become
wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and 3) as the responsiveness of courts to
resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the
underlying ideology of the court.
Subjects
Modelling of Political Institutions
Administrative Regulation
Regulation
Lobbying
Litigation
Corporate Political Strategy
Interest Groups
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