Evidence and truth
Name
11098_2023_Article_1919.pdf
Size
591.63 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
f8af69560fd80e89e6923e39db6bf14c
Author(s)
White, Roger
Date Issued
February 20, 2023
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
White, Roger. 2023. "Evidence and truth."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently have any and perhaps also that I won’t get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña’s view.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01919-5
