Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions

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Chen, Micali (2016) Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions.pdf

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Final published version.
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Author(s)
Chen, Jing
•
Micali, Silvio
Date Issued
October 26, 2016
Publisher
MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali
Citation
Chen, J., & Micali, S. (2016). Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Games, 7(4), 32–50.
Version
Final published version.
Abstract
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion.
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