17.812J / 14.296J Collective Choice I, Fall 2008
Author(s)
Snyder, James
Alternative Title
Collective Choice I
Date Issued
December 2008
Abstract
This is an applied theory course covering topics in the political economy of democratic countries. This course examines political institutions from a rational choice perspective. The now burgeoning rational choice literature on legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, and elections constitutes the chief focus. Some focus will be placed on institutions from a comparative and/or international perspective.
Subjects
political economy
rational choice
legislature
bureaucracy
court
and elections
electoral competition
comparative
international
public goods
government
taxation
income redistribution
macroeconomic policy
multiparty competition
electoral system
voter
agency models
models of political parties
point-valued solution
set-valued solution
probabilistic voting models
structure-induced equilibrium models
vote-buying
vote-trading
Colonel Blotto
minorities
interest groups
lobbying
bargaining
coalitions
government stability
informational theory
distributive theory
legislative-executive relations
representative democracy
direct democracy
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