14.15J / 6.207J Networks, Fall 2009
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14-15j-fall-2009/contents/index.htm
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Checksum (MD5)
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Ozdaglar, Asu
Alternative Title
Networks
Date Issued
December 2009
Abstract
Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a network over which funds flow and risks are shared. Systemic risk in financial markets often results from the counterparty risks created within this financial network. Food chains, interacting biological systems and the spread and containment of epidemics are some of the other natural and social phenomena that exhibit a marked networked structure. This course will introduce the tools for the study of networks. It will show how certain common principles permeate the functioning of these diverse networks and how the same issues related to robustness, fragility, and interlinkages arise in several different types of networks.
Subjects
networks
crowds
markets
highly connected world
social networks
economic networks
power networks
communication networks
game theory
graph theory
branching processes
random graph models
rich get richer phenomena
power laws
small worlds
Erd?s-Renyi graphs
degree distributions
phase transitions
connectedness
and giant component
link analysis
web search
navigation
decentralized search
preferential attachment
epidemics
diffusion through networks
SIR
(susceptible
infected
removed)
SIS
(susceptible
infected
susceptible)
strategies
payoffs
normal forms
Nash equilibrium
traffic networks
negative externalities
Braess' paradox
potential games
myopic behavior
fictitious play
repeated games
prisoner's dilemma
cooperation
perfect information
imperfect information
positive externalities
strategic complements
path dependence
diffusion of innovation
contagion pheonomena
Bayes's rule
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
first price auctions
second price auctions
social learning
Bayesian learning
copying
herding
herd behavior
informational cascades
decisions
social choice
Condorcet jury theorem
political economy
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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