Perfect Implementation
Name
Micali_Perfect Implementation (rev).pdf
Size
298.38 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
2adad7268193bf4613b543a8955ab3f9
Author(s)
Izmalkov, Sergei
Lepinski, Matt
Micali, Silvio
Date Issued
May 2010
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
Izmalkov, Sergei, Matt Lepinski, and Silvio Micali. "Perfect Implementation." Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
Privacy and trust a effect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism
design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism
|by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator| may fail to reach the mechanism's
objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type.
We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, a
concrete extensive-form mechanism exactly preserving all strategic properties of M, without relying on a
trusted mediator or violating the privacy of the players.
We prove that any normal-form mechanism can be perfectly implemented by a verifiable mediator using
envelopes and an envelope-randomizing device (i.e., the same tools used for running fair lotteries or tallying
secret votes). Differently from a trusted mediator, a verifiable one only performs prescribed public actions,
so that everyone can verify that he is acting properly, and that he never learns any information that should
remain private.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Terms of Use
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.003
