Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone
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Acemoglu_Chiefs.pdf
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1.66 MB
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Adobe PDF
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Author(s)
Acemoglu, Daron
Reed, Tristan
Robinson, James A.
Date Issued
April 2014
Journal
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press, The
Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Tristan Reed, and James A. Robinson. “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone.” Journal of Political Economy 122, no. 2 (April 2014): 319–368. © 2014 The University of Chicago.
Version
Final published version
Abstract
We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanism. Paradoxically, with fewer ruling families, the institutions of chiefs' authority are more highly respected, and measured social capital is higher. We argue that these results reflect the capture of civil society organizations by chiefs.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1086/674988
