Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering
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11098_2023_Article_1978.pdf
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947.86 KB
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5459c7b9cb4ff74b0852ef74cb4e8519
Author(s)
Flores, Carolina
Woodard, Elise
Date Issued
June 17, 2023
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Citation
Flores, Carolina and Woodard, Elise. 2023. "Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering."
Version
Final published version
Abstract
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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Creative Commons Attribution
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DOI of Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01978-8
