Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots
Name
Angrist_Accountability and.pdf
Size
855.54 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum (MD5)
92d5bef9ee77713042bf36170c5fb115
Author(s) • • • •
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
Angrist, Joshua
Dynarski, Susan M.
Kane, Thomas J.
Pathak, Parag
Date Issued
March 2011
Journal
Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
President and Fellows of Harvard College
Citation
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila et al. "Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots." Quarterly Journal of Economics, (2011) 126(2): 699-748.
Version
Author's final manuscript
Abstract
We use student assignment lotteries to estimate the effect of charter school attendance on
student achievement in Boston. We also evaluate a related alternative, Boston's pilot schools. Pilot schools have some of the independence of charter schools, but operate within the Boston Public School district and are covered by some collective bargaining provisions. Lottery estimates show large and significant score gains for charter students in middle and high school. In contrast, lottery estimates for pilot school students are mostly small and insignificant, with some significant negative effects. Charter schools with binding assignment lotteries appear to generate larger gains than other charters.
MIT Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
Terms of Use
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0
Persistent DSpace Link
DOI of Published Version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr017
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr017