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<title>CTPID Archive</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1778" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle>Materials from early CTPID research, former programs, and
associated scholars</subtitle>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1778</id>
<updated>2026-05-16T01:29:38Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-05-16T01:29:38Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>The Emergence of Trade Associations as Agents of Environmental Performance Improvement</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1604" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Nash, Jennifer</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1604</id>
<updated>2019-04-08T08:07:13Z</updated>
<published>2002-08-26T15:40:39Z</published>
<summary type="text">The Emergence of Trade Associations as Agents of Environmental Performance Improvement
Nash, Jennifer
This paper explores a surprising phenomenon: the emergence of trade associations as agents of environmental performance improvement.  Trade associations in the United States have historically fought environmental regulation, not embraced it.  Trade associations are generally organized to service the needs of their members, not control their behavior.  Yet, since the late 1980s, seven trade associations representing manufacturing sectors have enacted codes of practice with the stated goal of enhancing member companies' environmental performance.  &#13;
	Four of these codes have been developed by trade associations in the chemicals sector.  The other trade associations represent oil, forestry, and textile industries. This paper explores why and how trade associations have attempted to exert authority over members' environmental performance.  First, the specific factors that caused each trade association to develop its code are discussed.  Second, the codes are compared in terms of three dimensions: the environmental practices they require, the techniques used to share values and practices among members, and the authority structures used to ensure compliance.  A final section offers observations about the conditions under which codes are likely to emerge and considers their implications for public policy.  By seeing where and how this trade association activity is emerging, it is possible to begin to understand the limits, and the potential, of this approach as a tool for moving firms in the direction of environmental performance improvement and sustainability.&#13;
&#13;

</summary>
<dc:date>2002-08-26T15:40:39Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ISO 14001 and EPA Region I's StarTrack Program: Assessing their Potential as Tools in Environmental Protection</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1603" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>MacDonagh-Dumler, Jeffrey</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Thorens, Pascal</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Ehrenfeld, John</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Nash, Jennifer</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1603</id>
<updated>2019-04-08T08:00:36Z</updated>
<published>2002-08-26T15:36:05Z</published>
<summary type="text">ISO 14001 and EPA Region I's StarTrack Program: Assessing their Potential as Tools in Environmental Protection
MacDonagh-Dumler, Jeffrey; Thorens, Pascal; Ehrenfeld, John; Nash, Jennifer
The goals of the EPA Office of Reinvention are the following:&#13;
&#13;
1) use incentives and promote environmental management systems (EMSs)&#13;
2) provide timely and accessible compliance-assistance&#13;
3) create flexible and streamlined permitting&#13;
4) help communities make sound environmental decisions &#13;
&#13;
This research explores two recent initiatives related to those goals: ISO 14001 and the EPA Region I's StarTrack program.  We studied ISO 14001 through two approaches: a statistical analysis of the characteristics of early adopters, and case studies at six chemical facilities, five of which had adopted the standard.  To study StarTrack, we interviewed managers at four of the six facilities that have participated in the program since its inception, as well as EPA staff members at the regional and national levels, state environmental officials, and representatives of environmental advocacy groups.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-08-26T15:36:05Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Voluntary Codes of Practice: Non-Governmental Institutions for Promoting Environmental Management by Firms</title>
<link href="https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1602" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Nash, Jennifer</name>
</author>
<id>https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1602</id>
<updated>2019-04-08T08:00:36Z</updated>
<published>2002-08-26T15:27:08Z</published>
<summary type="text">Voluntary Codes of Practice: Non-Governmental Institutions for Promoting Environmental Management by Firms
Nash, Jennifer
This paper is divided into three parts.  The first part explores the question of why certain trade associations have developed environmental codes for their members.  The second part considers the effectiveness of trade association codes in improving environmental performance. The third section offers conclusions about where trade association codes may be achieving results.
</summary>
<dc:date>2002-08-26T15:27:08Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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