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dc.contributor.advisorAlbert Saiz.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJimenez Mejia, Lina Men_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T18:41:40Z
dc.date.available2016-07-01T18:41:40Z
dc.date.copyright2016en_US
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103453
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M. in Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Program in Real Estate Development in conjunction with the Center for Real Estate, 2016.en_US
dc.descriptionTitle as it appears in the Degrees awarded booklet, Feb. 17, 2016: A N lease for housing rental: transferring the property taxes to renters. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 140-141).en_US
dc.description.abstractOwnership rates have been decreasing since 2004, and the rental market is becoming less affordable each day. A rent-to-own agreement would reduce barriers to purchase a property for future buyers. However, to promote this type of contract it is necessary to demonstrate that investors will be exposed to lower risk, or higher returns, than in a traditional lease. Since taxes are an important part of a real estate investment, this thesis analyzed if this risk can be mitigated by passing the taxes to the tenants. While rents and prices respond to market conditions, property taxes do not show a clear trend of how they change, leaving investors exposed to a high risk. In addition, property taxes significantly differ among states since they vary with the financial needs of each local government. Moreover, the effective tax rate can also differ from town to town, and even within the city because of the different tax districts in which the property is located and the No Ad Valorem taxes. The evolution of taxes, prices and rent in Massachusetts, and within the cities of Arlington, Newton and Wellesley is explored in this thesis to understand how property taxes evolve over the years and see if changes in rent and/or prices upset variations in taxes. In addition, this thesis also considers the evolution of these variables in Larimer County, Colorado, and in Oak Park, Illinois. Moreover, this thesis analyzed the potential return of a residential property in each of the cities studied to establish if there is any financial advantage for signing in a RTO agreement instead of a traditional lease, and if capping the taxes would reduce the financial risk. The data shows that in cities that saw a high appreciation or rental growth singing a rent-to-own contract was not the best alternative for investors since their return would have been lower. In addition, passing the taxes is not attractive enough to investors since the additional points that this procedure offers are not significant, and in some case, when taxes decrease, they actually decrease the investor's return.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Lina M. Jimenez Mejia.en_US
dc.format.extent141 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectCenter for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.en_US
dc.titleRent-to-own contracts and tax risken_US
dc.title.alternativeN lease for housing rental : transferring the property taxes to renters.en_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M. in Real Estate Developmenten_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate
dc.identifier.oclc952175043en_US


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