An integrated framework for the vulnerability assessment of complex supply chain systems

Abstract

Supply chains are critical to delivering components and products safely, affordably, and securely. However, these complex networks of suppliers, manufacturers, and customers are vulnerable to internal and external disruptions and subject to exploitation. This can result in adverse impacts to the system and inhibit value delivery. This thesis proposes a generic electronics supply chain model that can guide a user through different vulnerability assessment techniques and reveal information regarding system vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for decision-makers to intervene. The model draws upon a previously-developed Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) analytic technique and assists with making decisions affecting complex systems, including those operating in resource-constrained environments. Elements of System Security Engineering (SSE) and Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN) analysis are taken into consideration, and leading indicators are utilized to provide a greater understanding of security concerns and impacts to a supply chain focusing on electronics for the defense industry. The model, adaptable to a diversity of systems and capable of recognizing non-obvious sources of vulnerability, can be used by systems engineers to provide a holistic view of a complex supply chain. The model facilitates the communication of information regarding supply chain vulnerabilities to decision-makers and other individuals.