Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)
      We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ...
    • Tight revenue bounds with possibilistic beliefs and level-k rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© The Econometric Society, 2015-07)
      Mechanism design enables a social planner to obtain a desired outcome by leveraging the players’ rationality and their beliefs. It is thus a fundamental, but yet unproven, intuition that the higher the level of rationality ...