Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2016-10-26)
      In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the ...
    • The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio (John Wiley & Sons, Inc./© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2013-01-22)
      Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process ...
    • Resilient mechanism design foundations for governance of cyberspace: Exploration in theory, strategy, and policy 

      Micali, Silvio; Choucri, Nazli; Chen, Jing; Williams, Cindy (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013-09)
      Three related trends in world politics – shifting in power relations, increased diversity of actors and entities, and the growing mobilization and politicization of global constituencies are contributing to a global “tussle” ...