Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR): Recent submissions
Now showing items 40-42 of 112
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Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
(MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2016-10-26)In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the ... -
The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc./© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali, 2013-01-22)Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process ... -
Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
(© Elsevier B.V., 2012-01-17)We show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the Vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply. We thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very ...