Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR): Recent submissions

Now showing items 10-12 of 112

    • Knightian auctions 

      Chiesa, Alessandro; Micali, Silvio; Zhu, Zeyuan Allen (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012-01-10)
      We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mech- anism designer knows δ. The classical notions of implementation ...

    • Possibilistic beliefs and higher-level rationality 

      Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio; Pass, Rafael (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014-06-09)
      We consider rationality and rationalizability for normal-form games of incomplete information in which the players have possibilistic beliefs about their opponents. In this setting, we prove that the strategies compatible ...

    • Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players 

      Chen, Jing; Hassidim, Avinatan; Micali, Silvio (© Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010-01-13)
      We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is ...