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dc.contributor.authorSetiya, Kieran
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-06T21:26:34Z
dc.date.available2017-01-06T21:26:34Z
dc.date.issued2015-07
dc.identifier.issn0031-8205
dc.identifier.issn1933-1592
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106280
dc.description.abstractIn Rationality Through Reasoning, John Broome explores the nature of reasons, rationality, and what he calls “the central ought.” His discussion is rich in distinctions, arguments, and controversial claims. It is also dauntingly rigorous: I am sure I have not mastered Broome’s system. In what follows, I risk some tentative questions about its application to ethics, raising objections and offering an alternative view. There is a lot in Broome’s meticulous, wide-ranging book that I will not address.en_US
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherWiley Blackwellen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12202en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceProf. Setiya via Mark Szarkoen_US
dc.titleBroome on Reasons to Acten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSetiya, Kieran. “Broome on Reasons to Act.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91.1 (2015): 204–210.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.approverSetiya, Kieranen_US
dc.contributor.mitauthorSetiya, Kieran
dc.relation.journalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Researchen_US
dc.eprint.versionAuthor's final manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dspace.orderedauthorsSetiya, Kieranen_US
dspace.embargo.termsNen_US
dc.identifier.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0669-8556
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICYen_US


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