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dc.contributor.advisorRoger D. Petersen.en_US
dc.contributor.authorAnderson, Noel Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-20T19:39:09Z
dc.date.available2017-03-20T19:39:09Z
dc.date.copyright2016en_US
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/107541
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 197-210).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation explores two interrelated puzzles about external intervention and internal war. The first asks why rebels, governments, and third party interveners often continue to invest in costly and protracted conflicts rather than sue for peace and a negotiated settlement. The second considers the consequences of these behaviors for temporal variation in the average duration and global prevalence of civil wars. A central finding that emerges concerns the critical role of competitive intervention-two sided, simultaneous military assistance from different third party states to both government and rebel combatants-in the dynamics and intractability of civil wars across time and around the globe. Developing a generalizable theory of competitive intervention, the dissertation explains the distortionary effects this form of external meddling has on domestic bargaining processes, describes the unique strategic dilemmas it entails for third party interveners, and links its varying prevalence to international systemic change. In doing so, it moves beyond popular anecdotes about "proxy wars" by deriving theoretically-grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating competitive intervention in civil wars. It also uncovers a heretofore overlooked feature of this form of intervention-namely, that "not losing" is often more important than "winning" from the perspective of third party interveners under the shadow of inadvertent escalation. The theory is tested with a mixed-method design that combines statistical analyses of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 with detailed case studies of competitive intervention in Angola (1975-1991) and Afghanistan (1979-1992). The dissertation's theoretical and empirical results shed new light on the international dimensions of civil war, address ongoing debates concerning the utility of intervention as a conflict management tool, and inform policy prescriptions aimed at resolving some of today's most violent internal conflicts.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Noel Thomas Anderson.en_US
dc.format.extent210 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleCompetitive intervention and its consequences for civil warsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
dc.identifier.oclc974496457en_US


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