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dc.contributor.advisorAbel Sanchez.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWhyte, David L., 1967-en_US
dc.contributor.otherSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-21T18:21:23Z
dc.date.available2017-06-21T18:21:23Z
dc.date.copyright2017en_US
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/110143
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M. in Engineering and Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, System Design and Management Program, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 113-118).en_US
dc.description.abstractWith increased Internet connectivity and the advent of the industrial Internet, cyber-physical systems are increasingly being targeted by cyber attacks. Unlike, cyber attacks on IT networks, successfully compromising a cyber-physical environment takes considerably more time, motivation, expertise, and operational costs to the adversary. This thesis explores how a systems-theoretic approach, the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), can be used by an organization to complement intelligence-driven models of intrusion analysis to provide both additional insight and prioritize defensive countermeasures in order to guard against cyber-physical attacks and compromises. Specifically, in this thesis we analyze two real-world use cases of well publicized cyber-physical attacks using traditional intelligence-driven models of intrusion analysis as well as apply the Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) model on one of the use cases. The STAMP/CAST based analysis afforded us deeper insights into the system causal factors that led to the successful compromise. In turn, this allowed for the generation of specific recommendations to safeguard the cyber-physical systems within the network in order to increase the overall organizational security posture. This included a recommendation to modify the existing organizational structure (i.e., the addition of a Security Operations Centre function) such that clearly defined security roles and responsibilities could be effectively implemented thus significantly improving an organization's ability to respond to cyber attacks.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby David Whyte.en_US
dc.format.extent118 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectEngineering and Management Program.en_US
dc.subjectSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.titleUsing a systems-theoretic approach to analyze cyber attacks on cyber-physical systemsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M. in Engineering and Managementen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering and Management Program.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSystem Design and Management Program.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSystem Design and Management Program
dc.identifier.oclc987237180en_US


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