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dc.contributor.advisorDavid D. Clark.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMarkel, Zane Aen_US
dc.contributor.otherTechnology and Policy Program.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-15T14:20:37Z
dc.date.available2017-09-15T14:20:37Z
dc.date.copyright2017en_US
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111236
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M. in Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Technology and Policy Program, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionThis electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 89-99).en_US
dc.description.abstractTo maximize the value of the Internet of Things (IoT), developers need to build devices that balance security with features, cost, and usability, relative to the threats that their particular devices will face. However, many IoT devices have thus far failed to achieve this balance. Various organizations have published copious security frameworks to help developers. Of these, frameworks that focus on desirable outcome metrics remain theoretically desirable yet infeasible to use in practice. The other frameworks, which focus on some aspect of the development process itself, are widely used despite a lack of methods for determining their utility. This work introduces six criteria useful for evaluating and comparing these process-based frameworks. Applying them to multiple security frameworks, we find that these frameworks often derive from inflexible conceptions of security, limiting the ability of developers to to vary their security designs. Even when developers are given options, they lack the tools necessary to balance security with other tradeoffs respective to the situations their products will be used in. To begin to address these shortcomings, we propose the Processes for Reasonably Secure Design (PRSD), a novel process-based security framework that helps developers comprehensively and systematically consider the security threats an IoT device may introduce to its surroundings, options for mitigating those threats, and the tradeoffs between those options. To demonstrate its worth, we apply it in multiple case studies. Further, using the six criteria, we evaluate PRSD and find that, in addition to providing useful and novel guidance, it has practical qualities that could make it suitable for many real development efforts.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Zane Alexander Markel.en_US
dc.format.extent190 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectInstitute for Data, Systems, and Society.en_US
dc.subjectEngineering Systems Division.en_US
dc.subjectTechnology and Policy Program.en_US
dc.titleDesigning networked objects to achieve reasonable securityen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M. in Technology and Policyen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society
dc.contributor.departmentTechnology and Policy Program
dc.identifier.oclc1003284299en_US


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