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dc.contributor.advisorVann McGee.en_US
dc.contributor.authorJenny, Matthias (Matthias Christian)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-16T19:27:30Z
dc.date.available2018-02-16T19:27:30Z
dc.date.copyright2017en_US
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113731
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionThis electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 147-157).en_US
dc.description.abstractThe semantic paradoxes and other statements about impossibilities have proved to be obstacles to a satisfactory theory of conditionals. In my dissertation, which consists of two parts, I propose a new approach to the impossible that yields an improved theory of conditionals. A prominent response to the semantic paradoxes is glut theory. Glut theorists avoid paradox by giving up material modus ponens. But they argue that they can help themselves to this rule in areas where no paradoxes loom. In chapter 1, I argue that this does not work and that giving up modus ponens in paradoxical domains leaves glut theorists with a weak logic everywhere. One option that's available to glut theorists involves pragmatic innovation. In chapter 2, I explore the consequences of giving glut theorists the pragmatic resources that are already available the proponents of gap theory, the dual of glut theory. The resulting hybrid theory, which makes use of two distinct speech acts of assertion, is glap theory. Surprisingly, the logic of glap theory is a quite strong logic that adds to the logics of glut and gap theory two hybrid forms of modus ponens. Turning to counterfactual conditionals, the second half of my dissertation concerns the vacuity thesis, which says that all counterpossible conditionals are vacuously true. In chapter 3, I argue that the strongest case against the vacuity thesis comes from counterpossibles as they appear in relative computability theory. I show that relative computability theorists crucially invoke counterpossibles when they define the central notions of their theory. I also provide a model theory for a quantified language that can express such counterpossibles. The logical properties of counterfactuals about relative computability deserve closer attention. In chapter 4, I provide an axiomatization of a propositional fragment of the model theory developed in chapter 3 and prove that the axiomatization is complete and that the resulting conditional logic is decidable. This logic display some surprising features. While validating modus ponens, it also contains a restricted form of the import-export law.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Matthias Jenny.en_US
dc.format.extent157 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectLinguistics and Philosophy.en_US
dc.titleTaming the impossibleen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D. in Philosophyen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
dc.identifier.oclc1022566232en_US


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