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dc.contributor.advisorDaron Acemoglu and Benjamin Olken.en_US
dc.contributor.authorOrnaghi, Ariannaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBanerjee, Abhijit Ven_US
dc.contributor.authorFinkelstein, Amyen_US
dc.contributor.authorHanna, Remaen_US
dc.contributor.authorOlken, Benjamin Aen_US
dc.contributor.authorSumarto, Sudarno, 1960-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-02T22:22:09Z
dc.date.available2018-03-02T22:22:09Z
dc.date.copyright2017en_US
dc.date.issued2017en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113994
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis. "Joint with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto"--Page 115, Chapter 3.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 151-156).en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters explore how different organizational forms, and in particular different hiring and firing practices, affect bureaucracies. In the first chapter, I study how the introduction of merit systems reducing politicians' control over police officers' hiring and firing affected police performance in the 1970s. I exploit population-based mandates for police department merit systems in a regression discontinuity design. Merit systems improved performance: in the first ten years after the reform, the property crime rate was lower and the violent crime clearance rate was higher in departments operating under a merit system than in departments operating under a spoils system. I explore three possible channels: resources, police officers' characteristics and police officers' incentive structure. Employment and expenditures were not affected and there is limited evidence of selection changing pre-1940. Instead, I provide indirect evidence that changes in the incentive structure faced by police officers were likely important. In the second chapter, I study how the introduction of civil service boards in charge of meritocratic hiring affected the demographic composition and the performance of police officers, fire fighters and other municipal employees 1900-1940. Identification exploits the staggered timing of the reform in large municipalities using a differences-in-differences design. I find that civil service boards decreased the probability that police officers were first or second generation immigrants but mixed evidence on how the demographic characteristics of other workers were affected. Finally, I find that no effect on police performance. The third chapter, joint with with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto, analyzes a large-scale experiment in Indonesia. In particular, we study how a national governmental health insurance program characterized by flexible coverage responds to subsidies and assisted registration through a website. Lowering prices and reducing hassle costs increase enrollment but households often let their coverage lapse. Subsidies attract healthier households in the short run, but over time the average value of claims equalizes because of differential claim dynamics. Overall, we find that, when dynamic adjustments to coverage are possible, subsidies do not improve the financial sustainability of health insurance programs.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Arianna Ornaghi.en_US
dc.format.extent156 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays in political economyen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc1023802340en_US


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