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dc.contributor.advisorBarry R. Posen.en_US
dc.contributor.authorAndrews, Lena Simoneen_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-08T19:48:29Z
dc.date.available2018-08-08T19:48:29Z
dc.date.copyright2018en_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117308
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (pages 389-408).en_US
dc.description.abstractmilitaries learn in war by developing and testing a theory of wartime military learning in the joint operational context. In doing so, the dissertation makes three related arguments. First, it examines not just whether militaries learn in war, but how militaries learn in war. Specifically, it defines learning as a process that includes two distinct but related phases: first, identifying a problem and, second, implementing a solution. From this conceptual standpoint, the dissertation then proposes a theory of wartime military learning that can explain and predict both whether and how a military is likely to learn the lessons of war, which I call Military Filtration Theory (MFT). MFT argues that wartime military learning is best explained by examining the interaction of two key variables: first, the state's national military strategy and, second, the military's resource endowments. These two variables act as a filter on the information that is identified and absorbed by military organizations throughout the learning process. Finally, the dissertation tests MFT against several alternative explanations in the novel and challenging empirical setting of joint operations. Specifically, I examine the different experiences of the British, American, and German militaries in successfully learning to execute tactical airpower operations during World War II. In addition to demonstrating variation in the learning process, these three cases allow me to focus on a subset of joint operations that sets a high bar for existing theories of military learning in ways that the extant literature does not. The findings of this study provide new theoretical and empirical insights for students of military learning, as well as several practical lessons for policymakers and warfighters.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Lena Simone Andrews.en_US
dc.format.extent408 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectPolitical Science.en_US
dc.titleOne fighting machine : joint learning and tactical airpower operations in World War IIen_US
dc.title.alternative1 fighting machine : joint learning and tactical airpower operations in World War IIen_US
dc.title.alternativeJoint learning and tactical airpower operations in World War IIen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc1045069374en_US


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