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dc.contributor.advisorEgor Matveyev.en_US
dc.contributor.authorZheng, Shuo, S.M. Sloan School of managementen_US
dc.contributor.otherSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-17T15:49:56Z
dc.date.available2018-09-17T15:49:56Z
dc.date.copyright2018en_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117918
dc.descriptionThesis: S.M. in Management Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018.en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (page 33).en_US
dc.description.abstractI study how the compensation structure of top managers from US public companies changes in recent years and the effect of these incentives on firm performance. I first explore the trend of executive compensation structure and performance metrics used in executive compensation over the years. I also examine systematic differences across industries and different firm sizes. Then I analyze the relationship between compensation structure and firm performance. My results suggest that a higher level of incentive-based compensation correlates with higher growth in total shareholder return; particularly for small firms, a higher level of incentive-based compensation correlates with significantly higher total asset growth, sales growth and employment growth as well. To explore whether the level of incentive-based compensation has influence on firm performance, I use propensity score matching to reduce selection bias. My results suggest that the level of incentive-based compensation has no significant influence on firm performance.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Shuo Zheng.en_US
dc.format.extent62 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.titleUnderstanding high-powered incentives in organizationsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreeS.M. in Management Studiesen_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc1051222866en_US


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