Political learning and economic policymaking : governments of the left and of traditional labor-based parties during Latin America's golden decade (2003-2013)

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to explain variation in macroeconomic management among Latin American governments of the left and of traditional labor-based parties during the commodity boom that lasted from 2003 to 2013. In particular, it aims to explain why a set of governments during this period of loosened external constraints - in a break with the past, some of their peers, and theoretical expectations - exercised consistent macroeconomic restraint. The dissertation argues that political learning on the basis of inflationary crises in the 1970s and 1980s constitutes an important factor for explaining discipline during the commodity boom. Lessons from such crises instilled a respect for - what during the commodity boom were largely latent - economic constraints. Leaders of left and of traditional labor-based parties who embraced the lessons such processes had yielded therefore opted for disciplined fiscal and monetary policies. The dissertation argues further that political learning was the most likely to take place and be lasting when past crises had occurred in the context of resurgent left or labor-based parties and where individuals with direct experience of past crises had been incorporated into contemporary governments. Empirically the dissertation focuses on the governments of Evo Morales in Bolivia and Alan Garcia and Ollanta Humala in Peru, which pursued disciplined macroeconomic policies, and the government of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, which relinquished restraint. It is based on 104 elite interviews - including with several Ministers of Finances and close advisors of the relevant presidents - carried out over the course of nearly 8 months of fieldwork in 2015 and 2016 as well as a review of newspaper reporting and a variety of government and party documents. The dissertation also provides a toolkit for studying the effect of political learning by elites on outcomes. This set of tools centers on three criteria for systematically assessing the descriptive accuracy, relevance as a proximate cause, and independence of political learning. These criteria provide the basis for a transparent and structured empirical strategy for studying political learning and facilitate cross-case comparisons.