Plutus : measuring message gossiping in P2P networks and providing incentives in cryptocurrencies
Measuring message gossiping in P2P networks and providing incentives in cryptocurrencies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Yossi Gilad and Nickolai Zeldovich.
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In this thesis, we present Plutus, an efficient and game-theoretically proven incentive mechanism for Algorand, a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency. In order to operate, Algorand requires users to constantly propagate messages but has no mechanism to incentivize users to do so. Plutus solves this problem by keeping track of each message propagation path and rewarding the users who propagated messages using a lottery. We implemented a prototype of Plutus on top of Algorand to measure the performance and overhead of Plutus. Experimental results show that with Plutus, Algorand's block confirmation time increases by only 7% and that there is no penalty on Algorand's scalability.
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2018.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (pages 47-48).
DepartmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.