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dc.contributor.advisorRobert Townsend and Tavneet Suri.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCarlson, Stacy(Stacy Lynn)en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-11T21:54:11Z
dc.date.available2019-09-11T21:54:11Z
dc.date.copyright2018en_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122051
dc.descriptionThis electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2018en_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. "Some pages in the original document contain text that runs off the edge of the page"--Disclaimer Notice page.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I use rich individual- and household-level data to explore the impact of different forms of financial innovation on development outcomes in Africa. Chapters 1 and 2 utilize data from a digital lender that provides credit over mobile phones. Chapter 1 presents novel evidence on the magnitude of consumer liquidity constraints and the relative importance of the various forms of asymmetric information that may contribute to them. I find that borrowers almost always take out the maximum credit line available to them, consistent with short-term liquidity constraints. I then use quasi-experimental variation in credit policies across individuals and time to estimate the relative magnitude of selection and incentive effects among new borrowers. I find that information asymmetries go a long way toward explaining high observed default rates. Chapter 2, my job market paper, explores the impact of dynamic incentive schemes on borrower behavior in the digital credit market. I use a series of quasi-experiments induced by policy nonlinearities to estimate the effect of progressive lending policies on borrower repayment decisions. I find that new borrowers who receive a larger initial loan are more likely to default on that loan. By contrast, repeat borrowers who receive a larger loan (relative to their previous loan) are actually less likely to default. I provide evidence that this reflects a strategic repayment motive, whereby borrowers repay in order to get access to larger loans in the future. Chapter 3, written with Yu Shi, uses household-level data from a panel survey in Nigeria to explore the relative importance of formal versus informal finance. We find that informal financial markets remain important and are quite effective in enabling consumption smoothing by lower-income households and businesses in Nigeria.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Stacy Carlson.en_US
dc.format.extent228 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsMIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582en_US
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays in financial innovation and developmenten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh. D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.oclc1108620052en_US
dc.description.collectionPh.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economicsen_US
dspace.imported2019-09-11T21:54:09Zen_US
mit.thesis.degreeDoctoralen_US
mit.thesis.departmentEconen_US


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