Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs
Author(s)Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
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The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
DepartmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.