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dc.contributor.authorBlock, Juan I.
dc.contributor.authorFudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.authorLevine, David K.
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-20T22:49:27Z
dc.date.available2020-10-20T22:49:27Z
dc.date.issued2018-05
dc.date.submitted2018-04
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128136
dc.description.abstractWe study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs, and can remember this for some time, the length of their memory plays a key role: With short memories, aggregate play may not come close to Nash equilibrium unless the game satisfies an acyclicity condition. When agents have sufficiently long memory, generically aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium. However, unlike in the model where social information is solely about how well other agents are doing, mixed equilibria can be favored over pure ones. ©2019 The Authorsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipNSF Grant (1643517)en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherThe Econometric Societyen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE2626en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License 4.0en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.titleLearning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memoryen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationBlock, Juan I. et al., "Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory." Theoretical Economics 14, 1 (January 2019): 135–172 doi. 10.3982/TE2626 ©2018 Authorsen_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economicsen_US
dc.relation.journalTheoretical Economicsen_US
dc.eprint.versionFinal published versionen_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2019-10-22T18:31:13Z
dspace.date.submission2019-10-22T18:31:16Z
mit.journal.volume14en_US
mit.journal.issue1en_US


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