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dc.contributor.authorSpencer, Jack
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-17T13:04:44Z
dc.date.available2021-03-17T13:04:44Z
dc.date.issued2020-07
dc.date.submitted2019-10
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130150
dc.description.abstractConsequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory.en_US
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLCen_US
dc.relation.isversionof10.1007/s11098-020-01509-9en_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alikeen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/en_US
dc.sourceOther repositoryen_US
dc.titleRational monism and rational pluralismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.citationSpencer, Jack. “Rational monism and rational pluralism.” Philosophical Studies, 106, 3 (July 2020) © 2020 The Authoren_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.journalPhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.eprint.versionOriginal manuscripten_US
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticleen_US
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/NonPeerRevieweden_US
dc.date.updated2021-03-12T18:36:46Z
dspace.orderedauthorsSpencer, Jen_US
dspace.date.submission2021-03-12T18:36:48Z
mit.journal.volume106en_US
mit.journal.issue3en_US
mit.licenseOPEN_ACCESS_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusComplete


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