Exploitative friendships : manipulating asymmetric alliances

Abstract

This dissertation is the first systematic analysis of variation in alliance behavior in the context of asymmetric international security alliances. When weak states ally with stronger states - i.e. states with significantly greater military capabilities - what explains differences in the junior party's approach to the alliance relationship? Why do some junior allies show their strong willingness to coordinate their military policy with their senior partner, whereas others distance themselves from their senior partner? Why do some grow more dependent on their senior partner for security, while others pursue their own deterrent to reduce their dependence? Their military dependence is not necessarily determined by structural factors, as states generally have some room for maneuver to decide on the level of resources they extract for national security from their overall economic and technological capacity.

This variation in alliance behavior deserves scholarly attention, because these differences affect their senior partner's alliance management costs, including the chance of alliance entrapment - i.e. getting dragged into an unwanted war due to a junior ally's problematic behavior. When a senior partner has vested interests in the asymmetric alliances that advance its own interests, its junior partners, as parties to the alliance contracts, also have the power to "manipulate" their senior partner with a variety of strategies to maximize what are often noninstitutionalized benefits from their security relationships. To explain the variation in the junior partner's approach, the dissertation proposes a Theory of Asymmetric Alliance Strategy, a new paradigm for understanding four types of junior partner alliance behavior and strategy.

In essence, their differences are based upon differences relating to the two most contentious and yet core issues of alliance management - the junior ally's degree of dependence for security and its level of coordination with the senior partner. As junior allies choose one of the two opposing approaches to each of these two core issues, there are four different, mutually exclusive strategies: [More Dependent, Reluctant Coordination], [More Dependent, Proactive Coordination], [Less Dependent, Proactive Coordination], and [Less Dependent, Reluctant Coordination], which I call Cheap-riding, Rescue-compelling, Favor-currying, and Autonomy-seeking, respectively. The Theory posits that the following three factors determine a junior partner's choice of alliance strategy: (1) perceived senior partner commitments to fighting the adversary by force; (2) the junior partner's "revisionist" goal - i.e.

a goal of changing the local distribution of power and goods by force; and (3) the local balance of power. Particularly problematic from a senior partner's perspective is the Rescue-compelling strategy, which is driven by weak or weakened security commitments a junior ally perceives when it faces a local balance of power shifting in favor of its adversary. A junior ally utilizing this strategy can make a crisis escalation more likely and cause serious consequences including a costly war. By explaining the sources of the variation in alliance strategy and identifying risks associated with security partnerships with some types of junior allies, the dissertation helps better anticipate the costs of offering new security commitments to other states as well as those of withdrawing, or threatening to withdraw, existing commitments.