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dc.contributor.authorMarx, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorStoker, Thomas M
dc.contributor.authorSuri, Tavneet
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-27T20:35:28Z
dc.date.available2021-10-27T20:35:28Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136457
dc.description.abstract© 2019 American Economic Association. Using unique data from one of Africa's largest informal settlements, the Kibera slum in Nairobi, we provide evidence of ethnic patronage in the determination of rental prices and investments. Slum residents pay higher rents and live in lower quality housing (measured via satellite pictures) when the landlord and the locality chief belong to the same ethnicity. Conversely, rental prices are lower, and investments higher when residents and chiefs are co-ethnics. Our identification relies on the exogenous appointment of chiefs and is supported by several tests, including a regression discontinuity design.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.relation.isversionof10.1257/APP.20160484
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
dc.sourceAmerican Economic Association
dc.titleThere Is No Free House: Ethnic Patronage in a Kenyan Slum
dc.typeArticle
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Management
dc.relation.journalAEJ: Applied Economics
dc.eprint.versionFinal published version
dc.type.urihttp://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle
eprint.statushttp://purl.org/eprint/status/PeerReviewed
dc.date.updated2021-02-24T17:13:33Z
dspace.orderedauthorsMarx, B; Stoker, TM; Suri, T
dspace.date.submission2021-02-24T17:15:05Z
mit.journal.volume11
mit.journal.issue4
mit.licensePUBLISHER_POLICY
mit.metadata.statusAuthority Work and Publication Information Needed


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