Consequence-Based Methodology to Determine Physical Security Requirements for Micro-Reactors

Abstract

Micro-reactors are an emerging advanced fission technology seeking to provide clean energy solutions to aid in the global de-carbonization of energy systems. Without changes to current NRC regulations, micro-reactors may face unduly burdensome onsite physical security costs, leading to reduced economic attractiveness of the technology. A consequence-based methodology is developed and applied to two micro-reactor plants- the Oklo Aurora and the MIT Research Reactor- to better understand if the worst-case consequences of security breaches at micro-reactors warrant the need for onsite physical protection systems. Preliminary results indicate that micro-reactors may be able to prove that, based on inherent plant mitigation features alone, there are no unacceptable radiological consequences associated with any form of security attack on the plant. This would indicate that onsite physical security, including onsite armed guards, may not be necessary for micro-reactors to ensure the protection of the environment and public health and safety.