A Defense of Impermissivism

Abstract

This dissertation is a defense of Impermissivism, which is the thesis that there is never more than one rational response to a single body of evidence.

Permissivism is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a single body of evidence. It faces a troubling arbitrariness objection. One variety of Permissivism—Standards Permissivism—does not appear to face this objection. In Chapter One, I argue that the normative structure of Standards Permissivism is under-explored: there is no good explanation for why a subject is rationally required to adhere to her standard. Without such an explanation, the view both fails to sidestep the arbitrariness objection and fails to be plausible. After reviewing the various alternatives, I argue that the only way for a Standards Permissivist to explain the requisite normative force is by adopting the “Belief Account” of standards. I then explore some upshots of my argument: in particular, my argument has the consequence that Standards Permissivism is a form of Unacknowledged Permissivism.

Unacknowledged Simple Permissivism can be understood as an alternative to Standards Permissivism in that both are potential responses to the arbitrariness objection. In Chapter Two, I argue that we should regard Unacknowledged Simple Permissivism as the more attractive option for an arbitrariness-avoidant Permissivist. This is partly because—as I argue in Chapter One—the Standards Permissivist is already saddled with the major drawback of Unacknowledged Simple Permissivism: that there are no acknowledged permissive cases. I argue that Unacknowledged Simple Permissivism is false by presenting a variant of the original arbitrariness objection, but as applied to an ideal agent. In order to make this argument, I argue for a certain restriction on views about higher-order evidence: in particular, higher-order evidence that your doxastic state is rational should not affect the rational status of that doxastic state.

In Chapter Three, I argue that even with the best available account of the normative force of standards, a new sort of arbitrariness worry arises for the Standards Permissivist. In particular, this arbitrariness arises when a subject mistakenly forms a belief that is inconsistent with her standard in a permissive case. I argue that the Standards Permissivist lacks the resources to provide a satisfactory solution in such a case. The view therefore faces an arbitrariness objection of its own.