Applying Systems Theory to Analyze Cyber Resiliency of Naval Engineering Systems

Abstract

The U. S. Coast Guard, similar to many other maritime organizations, is increasingly adapting to the technologically advanced new age of cutters – vessels that are greater than 65 feet in length. This new technology results in more systems on board ships and cutters having cyber interactions and interfaces than before. As our systems at sea grow more connected to the digital and cyber worlds, our naval engineering systems face new threats that could compromise and damage essential engineering components. Potentially, access to these physical systems by threat actors through the cyber interactions could render a ship useless if proper response is not taken. Therefore, these physical systems need to adopt cyber resiliency as a new capability due to their technological advancements.

This research explores cyber resilience as a novel concept in the U.S. Coast Guard naval engineering field. Research defined the difference between cyber resiliency and cybersecurity, assessed how cyber resiliency can be measured for awareness and optimization, and explored how the System-Theoretic Process Analysis created by Dr. Nancy Leveson can be harnessed to identify potential resiliency gaps of these cyber-physical systems. Further, Systems Theory for cyber resiliency was applied to a U.S. Coast Guard cutter to explore its cyber resiliency capability and needs. Identifying the cyber resiliency needs of a cutter enabled the creation of a set of recommended system cyber resiliency requirements surrounding the automated controls of a naval propulsion system.