Using a System-Theoretic Approach for Cyber Mission Assurance of the Royal Canadian Air Force Over the Horizon Radar System

Abstract

Since 1958, the North American Aerospace Defence between Canada and the United States remains as the only bi-national military command in the world. Among many of its responsibilities, the need for early detection of threats against the North American aerospace demands improved visibility in terms of both range and coverage over the Northern Canadian Area of Responsibility. However, the existing fleet of radar systems are not only limited but fast approaching technological obsolescence against modern adversarial weapon systems. As a solution, the Royal Canadian Air Force committed to deliver the Over the Horizon Radar systems that will significantly enhance the existing NORAD capabilities in detecting adversarial northern approaches.

The Royal Canadian Air Force conducts Cyber Mission Assurance on its future weapon systems. Hence understanding of cyber vulnerabilities permeating the Over the Horizon Radar systems is a mandatory exercise that must take place concurrent to the Project Management and acquisition efforts. Considering this, a novel methodology known as the STPA-Sec is employed to conduct Cyber Mission Assurance of the Over the Horizon Radar systems. Contrary to the traditional methods to manage cyber risks, the STPA-Sec defines the scope of the system, illustrates the attack surface, as well, offers a set of operational constraints within which, if complied, minimizes risks of defined system failures. The application of STPA-Sec on the Over the Horizon Radar systems yields a concrete set of recommendations that, if followed, will minimize systemic and multi-faceted risks that are otherwise unconceivable using the traditional methods.