Market Mechanisms for Service Provider Operations in Advanced Air Mobility

Abstract

The proliferation of advanced air mobility (AAM) flights in the form of vertical take-off and landing aircraft (VTOL) and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) in the near future will require a new air traffic management system adapted for on-demand flights flying at low altitudes and far from existing airports and aviation hubs. The FAA has proposed UAS traffic maangement (UTM) and urban air mobility (UAM) as two concepts of operations for AAM, where private service providers (SPs) will be responsible for managing these novel forms of air traffic alongside but independently from existing air traffic control services. The roles and characteristics of these new SPs are still not well defined today.

In this work, we propose possible methods that can fulfill the concepts proposed. First, we present cost-aware prioritization methods based on the second price auction for air traffic management protocols for use in an SP's internal operations. Next, we show a Shapley value profit-sharing mechanism to incentivize cooperation cooperation in efficiently routing flights between SPs. Finally, we extend the Shapley value framework to accommodate multiple SPs in the same region of airspace, and study how the combination of airspace structure, traffic demand, and sector allocation leads to differences in profit earned between SPs. We conclude with future directions for studying and building service providers in the AAM context.

Keywords: advanced air mobility, Shapley value, service providers, market mechanisms