Essays in Labor and Education Economics

Abstract

This thesis consists of three chapters on labor economics and the economics of education. The first two chapters study the reasons behind racial disparities in school choices and propose two solutions to alleviate them: providing information about school quality and promoting attendance in racially integrated schools during earlier grades. Differences in school choice by race contribute to unequal access to effective schools and exacerbate school segregation. Conditional on test score and district of residence, Black and Hispanic families consistently opt for schools with fewer white and Asian students, lower average achievement, and lower value-added. The first chapter asks how information about school quality affects this gap. Specifically, I examine the effects of New York City’s introduction of a letter-grade system rating the quality of its high schools. The ratings shifted Black and Hispanic students’ choices more than those of white and Asian students, narrowing racial gaps both in enrollment at high-quality schools and in academic achievement. Using a structural model of school choice and surveys of families, I find that race differences in the response to quality information stem in part from different beliefs and preferences. The model estimates suggest that Black and Hispanic students have less accurate perceptions of school quality, making them more receptive to the grade-based scoring system. In addition, white and Asian students are less influenced by information on school quality because they have strong preferences for other school attributes. Simulations suggest that better quality information narrows racial gaps in choice and achievement. Additionally, simulations indicate that the design of information is important in determining who benefits most from its provision. A system that releases coarse quality ratings for high-quality or oversubscribed schools increases test scores among lower achieving students more than perfect information by reducing the competition for high-quality schools from higher achieving students. The second chapter, joint with Clemence Idoux, combines unique survey data and administrative data from New York City to identify the determinants of racial disparities in school choice and shows that attending a more diverse middle school can mitigate racial choice gaps. A post application survey with guardians of high school applicants reveals that information gaps and homophily in school preferences explain cross-race differences in choice. In turn, instrumental variable estimates show that middle school students exposed to more diverse peers apply to and enroll in high schools that are also more diverse. These effects are consistent across racial groups, particularly benefiting Black and Hispanic students who enroll in higher value-added 3highschools. Notably, changes in application patterns due to exposure to diverse middle school peers appear driven by changes in the set of known school options and an increased preference for peer diversity. The final chapter, joint with Lorenzo Lagos and Garima Sharma, investigates why workplaces are not better designed for women. In particular, we show that changing the priorities of those who set workplace policies can create female-friendly jobs. Starting in 2015, Brazil’s largest trade union federation made women central to its bargaining agenda. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits variation in affiliation to the federation, we find that “bargaining for women "increases female-centric amenities in collective bargaining agreements, which are then reflected in practice. These changes lead women to queue for jobs at treated establishments and separate from them less—both revealed preference measures of firm value. We find no evidence that these gains come at the expense of employment, wages, or firm profits. Our results suggest that changing institutional priorities can narrow the gender compensation gap. JEL Classification: I20, I21, J52