MIT Libraries logoDSpace@MIT

MIT
View Item 
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Graduate Theses
  • View Item
  • DSpace@MIT Home
  • MIT Libraries
  • MIT Theses
  • Graduate Theses
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Exploring the Dynamics of Regulatory Compliance, Cost Management, and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Author(s)
Wu, Lanchen
Thumbnail
DownloadThesis PDF (606.7Kb)
Advisor
Rahmandad, Hazhir
Terms of use
In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted Copyright retained by author(s) https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
This paper explores how financial pressures, regulatory enforcement, and market dynamics interact to shape pharmaceutical manufacturing quality and drug supply stability. Using a causal loop diagram (CLD), it examines how cost-cutting behavior affects control and validation capabilities, interacts with regulatory agency oversight, and contributes to recurring drug shortages. The analysis highlights how competition drive companies to operate at or near the minimum regulatory requirements, gradually eroding quality systems. Because of the nature of medical products, the quality of a drug cannot be directly assessed by individual users, distributors, or payers, making it necessary for government agencies like the FDA to rely on internal manufacturing data to ensure all drugs meet a minimum standard of quality. Regulatory oversight serves as a safeguard rather than a tool for guiding business decisions. However, its effectiveness is constrained by the frequency of inspections, the capacity of auditors, and limited resources—especially when government budgets are stretched and other priorities take precedence. The paper also discusses how manufacturers may avoid detection by strategically presenting information during inspections, making it harder for auditors to spot issues and allowing weakened controls to persist. Over time, these dynamics reinforce one another, creating a self-sustaining cycle in which cost pressures lead to a minimal compliance, quality issues, and regulatory responses that increase costs further. As the number of manufacturers shrinks due to market consolidation, supply disruptions become more severe when failures occur. Regulatory discretion—intended to avoid immediate shortages—can unintentionally reduce incentives for long-term quality investment, further weakening the system’s resilience. To address these issues, the paper proposes structural changes, including financial accountability for payers during shortages, tighter regulatory focus on process reliability, and linking regulatory flexibility to quality improvement obligations. These approaches aim to create balancing mechanisms that reduce cost-driven deterioration of quality and promote a more stable pharmaceutical supply chain.
Date issued
2025-05
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/163280
Department
Sloan School of Management
Publisher
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Collections
  • Graduate Theses

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

My Account

Login

Statistics

OA StatisticsStatistics by CountryStatistics by Department
MIT Libraries
PrivacyPermissionsAccessibilityContact us
MIT
Content created by the MIT Libraries, CC BY-NC unless otherwise noted. Notify us about copyright concerns.