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dc.contributor.advisorEsther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRamalho, Rita Maria, 1975-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-06-02T16:28:16Z
dc.date.available2005-06-02T16:28:16Z
dc.date.copyright2003en_US
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17630
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2003.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis is a collection of three essays on development economics and finance. The first chapter studies the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil to evaluate the impact of an anti-corruption drive on politically connected companies. I identify two types of firms: companies owned by friends and relatives of the impeached president ('family-connected') and firms proven to be connected to him in a parliamentary investigation ('other-connected'). Using an event study procedure, I establish that family-connected firms have on average negative daily abnormal returns of 2 to 9 percentage points when damaging information about the president is released. However, the 'other-connected' companies do not experience a decline in their stock market valuation during the impeachment. Furthermore, the stock market decline experienced by 'family connected' companies was reversed entirely within a year. The impeachment had limited success in reducing corruption. The second chapter evaluates the effects on multinational firms of the OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions". I compare the balance sheet performance of foreign companies in 24 developing host countries whose source countries have implemented the convention with the performance of firms whose source countries have not yet implemented it. I find that the OECD convention had a negative impact on profit and sales growth of multinational companies. This effect is amplified in countries with less efficient bureaucracies. In economies where bribery is more valuable to firms, the OECD convention has a larger negative impact on multinational firms. The third chapter studies in detail the distribution of one type of financial market participant: mutual funds. The essay documents that their size follows a regularity observed in several other area of economics, Zipf's law: the number of funds with size greater than x is proportional to 1/x. This chapter extends previous theories of random growth to explain why this is the case: Zipf's law arises when mutual funds grow at the highest speed allowed by constraints in the system, something we call a "maximum growth principle." We investigate empirically the key features of the theory, and show that they are validated by the data.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Rita Maria Ramalho.en_US
dc.format.extent109 p.en_US
dc.format.extent4774909 bytes
dc.format.extent4774716 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays in development economics and financeen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.identifier.oclc54771303en_US


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