Government intervention in production and incentives theory : a review of recent contributions

dc.contributor.author	Caillaud, Bernard
dc.date.accessioned	2005-09-15T13:47:19Z
dc.date.available	2005-09-15T13:47:19Z
dc.date.issued	1987
dc.identifier.other	19581905
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27204
dc.description.abstract	This paper reviews the recent literature on regulation under asymmetric information. If first develops the conceptual framework and offers a reminder of the techniques used in the field. It then applies the framework and techniques to a variety of situations, with or without the use of accounting data. Next, the analysis is extended to dynamics with or without commitment. The paper concludes with desirable directions for research.	en
dc.description.sponsorship	National Science Foundation, the Commissariat Général du Plan, and the Center for Energy Policy Research at M.I.T.	en
dc.format.extent	3159017 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dc.publisher	MIT Energy Lab	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	MIT-EL	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	87-019WP	en
dc.subject	Asymmetric information	en
dc.subject	Regulation	en
dc.subject	Public firms	en
dc.subject	Incentives	en
dc.subject	Auditing	en
dc.title	Government intervention in production and incentives theory : a review of recent contributions	en
dc.type	Working Paper	en