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dc.contributor.authorHausman, Jerry A.
dc.contributor.authorMacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-15T13:59:07Z
dc.date.available2005-09-15T13:59:07Z
dc.date.issued1988
dc.identifier.other19524104
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/27213
dc.description.abstractPatent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict. As an important example, there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power. In this article. we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases. Even ignoring the (dynamic) effects on incentives for innovation, third-degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise (static) social welfare. In fact, Pareto improvements may well occur. Welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders: (a) to open new markets and (b) to achieve economies of scale or learning. Further, even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses, it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms, such as length of patent life, for rewarding innovators with profits.en
dc.description.sponsorshipCenter for Energy Policy Research of the MIT Energy Laboratoryen
dc.format.extent1603207 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherMIT Energy Laben
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMIT-ELen
dc.relation.ispartofseries88-007WPen
dc.titlePrice discrimination and patent policyen
dc.typeWorking Paperen


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