Crossed swords : divided militaries and politics in East Asia

Abstract

(cont.) Domestic politics, then, frequently have a decisive impact on strategic planning and produces policies that the consideration of external threats alone would not suggest.

This dissertation proposes that militaries in developing states are usually deeply divided internally on domestic social, economic, and political issues. Contrary to the way the military is often portrayed, there is no single "military mind." Neither, however, are internal military divisions primarily idiosyncratic. Differences in composition and sociology endow different military services and branches with distinct domestic preferences. High-tech military organizations are more likely to support liberal socio-economic positions, while troop-oriented ones often embrace integral nationalism--a statist vision of development aimed at unifying the state by reducing economic and social differences. These propositions are tested against the history of armies and navies in Thailand, China, and Indonesia since 1945, as well as additional evidence from Latin American, European, and other Asian states. The case studies examine coups, counter-coups, military-sponsored "mass" movements, and legislative battles involving uniformed officers. The historical evidence confirms the theory. Military services often take opposite sides in domestic disputes, with naval officers consistently backing more liberal socio-economic positions than their army colleagues, especially those from the infantry branch. The balance of power between contending military actors frequently determines national political trajectories for decades at a stretch. These patterns of divided military involvement in politics carry critical implications for international security. The political leaders who emerge victorious from domestic battles often secure their military flank by giving substantial control over strategy and force planning to uniformed allies.