Farming for supermarkets : its collective good problems and what Brazilian growers have done about them

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the conditions under which growers have effectively resolved collective good problems associated with the rise of supermarkets. It answers two questions: What institutional arrangements have growers used to resolve collective problems and what explains the differences in these arrangements in terms of what they achieve and whom they benefit. Brazilian fresh fruit growers have turned to a variety of institutional arrangements in resolving collective good problems, including growers's associations, cooperatives, trade groups; closer ties with public sector agricultural research and extension agencies; and closer ties with their buyers and input suppliers. Economic incentives and constraints are at the basis of which strategy growers pursue and its effectiveness. Yet findings suggest that growers' responsiveness to the rise of supermarkets are also a function of incentives and constraints embedded in 1) the form of government support in the 1970s and 1980s which led to varying structures of production and government-grower relations that still predominate today, 2) crop characteristics that affect how growers organize, where more complex crops (costlier, riskier) are associated with greater collaborative efforts, and 3) Japanese-Brazilian ethnic ties that have facilitated the resolution of collective good problems among groups of medium growers. Interpreting the recent development of fruit production across these cases as a reflection of these locally-embedded factors suggests that developing country governments often have greater margin for action than that which is often portrayed.