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dc.contributor.advisorEsther Duflo.en_US
dc.contributor.authorLinden, Leigh L., 1975-en_US
dc.contributor.otherMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.en_US
dc.coverage.spatiala-ii---en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-27T18:32:32Z
dc.date.available2005-09-27T18:32:32Z
dc.date.copyright2004en_US
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28823
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2004.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) The remedial education program hires young women from the community to provide remedial assistance to third and fourth grade children who have fallen behind their peers. The program is extremely cheap (five dollars per child per year), and is easily replicable. We find the program to be very effective, increasing learning by 0.15 standard deviations in the first year, and 0.25 in the second year. The results are similar in the two grade levels, and in the two cities.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation comprises three separate empirical studies. Using a non-parametric regression discontinuity design that compares candidates who barely win an election to those who barely lose, the first study estimates the effect of incumbency on a candidate's electoral prospects in India. Starting in 1991, I estimate that, rather than being at an advantage, incumbents are actually fourteen percent less likely to win an election than similar non-incumbents. While the available data prevent a formal test, the dominance of a single political party (the Indian National Congress) before 1991 may have provided a framework in which experience was valuable because incumbents who gained experience under the Congress system would interact with the same system when reelected. Starting in 1991, however, no party could be counted on to control parliament, making experience under the previous regime potentially less valuable. The second study estimates the effects of new competitors on existing candidates in India by taking advantage of a change in the election laws in 1996 that made it more difficult for candidates to run for office. The law affected constituencies differently, allowing the use of both across time and between constituency variation in the number of candidates to estimate the impact of restricting the number of new candidates in an election. The resulting estimates suggest that the reduction in the number of new candidates had a small, but measurable effect on the probability that the average existing candidates would win election. However, there is evidence of heterogeneity in the effect across candidates. Finally, the third study presents the results of a two-year randomized evaluation of a remedial education program in India.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Leigh L. Linden.en_US
dc.format.extent125 p.en_US
dc.format.extent7559084 bytes
dc.format.extent7574843 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectEconomics.en_US
dc.titleEssays in development economics : incumbency disadvantage, political competition, and remedial education in Indiaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentMassachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
dc.identifier.oclc60345553en_US


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