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dc.contributor.advisorDuncan Simester.en_US
dc.contributor.authorShin, Jiwoong, 1971-en_US
dc.contributor.otherSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-09-27T18:35:04Z
dc.date.available2005-09-27T18:35:04Z
dc.date.copyright2004en_US
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28831
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, February 2005.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.description.abstract(cont.) that threaten to disappear cause decision makers to invest more effort and money in order to keep these options open, even when the options themselves seem to be of little interest. The last experiment provides initial evidence that the mechanism underlying the tendency to keep doors open is a type of loss aversion rather than a desire for flexibility.en_US
dc.description.abstractThe first essay studies the credibility of non-commitment advertising. To attract potential customers, retailers often advertise low prices with appeals such as Prices start at $49 or One week in the Caribbean from $449. We offer here an explanation of how such advertisements can construct a credible price image in the absence of any commitment based on the role of selling costs. When retailers must incur costs in the process of selling a product, advertising low prices to lure potential consumers can backfire. This is so because attracting too many consumers who are less likely to purchase the retailer's higher priced products imposes unwanted selling costs, but yields little extra revenue. We show analytically that such advertising can be credible only when there is a substantial difference in retailers' cost types or the selling cost is high. The second essay analyzes the free-riding problem under the situation where the selling costs are high. Intuitively, we can expect that free-riding will hurt the retailer who provides service. Nonetheless, we analytically show that free-riding actually benefits not only the free-riding retailer, but also the retailer who provides service. The intuition behind this result is that by allowing free-riding, the service provider can induce a softer re-action from its competitor who now enjoy free-riding. Therefore, allowing free-riding can be regarded as a strategic investment which prevents an aggressive response from the other retailer. The third essay adopts an experimental approach to the study of incentives. The question asked in this work is whether a threat of disappearance changes the way such options are valued. In four experiments using door games, we demonstrate that optionsen_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Jiwoong Shin.en_US
dc.format.extent142 p.en_US
dc.format.extent6266191 bytes
dc.format.extent6284917 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherMassachusetts Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.rightsM.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
dc.subjectSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.titleThree essays in marketingen_US
dc.title.alternative3 essays in marketingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.D.en_US
dc.contributor.departmentSloan School of Management.en_US
dc.identifier.oclc60363072en_US


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